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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4061 
___________ 
 
CARL HOOTEN, 
   Appellant 
v. 
 
GREGGO AND FERRARA COMPANY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-10-cv-00776) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 13, 2014 
 
Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 19, 2014 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In 2010, Carl Hooten filed an employment discrimination suit against his former 
employer, Greggo and Ferrara Company.  In 2012, on the defendant’s motion, the 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Greggo and Ferrara Company.  
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Soon thereafter, Hooten filed a motion to set aside the order, which the District Court 
denied. 
 More recently, on August 14, 2013, and on September 10, 2013, Hooten again 
filed motions to set aside the District Court’s order granting judgment in favor of Greggo 
and Ferrara Company.  In both motions, ostensibly in reliance on Rule 60 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Hooten asked the District Court to take notice of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s purported mishandling of his discrimination 
claim.  He also asserted that expert testimony regarding the union grievance process was 
disregarded.  He sought reopening to amend his complaint to add new claims.   
 The District Court denied Hooten’s motions.  Noting that Hooten did not specify 
the section of Rule 60 on which he relied, the District Court concluded that relief was not 
available under any section.  The District Court also specifically stated that relief for 
legal error was not available under Rule 60(b)(1) and that Hooten had not established any 
basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).  Hooten appeals.
1
 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Generally, we review orders 
denying Rule 60(b) motions for abuse of discretion.  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 
536 F.3d 244, 251 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining also that we exercise plenary review 
over orders granting or denying relief under Rule 60(b)(4)).  An appeal from the denial of 
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 He also presents a motion to submit the CD of his July 2009 arbitration hearing, which 
we also construe as a motion to expand the record on appeal.  Greggo and Ferrara 
Company oppose his motion and also ask us to award attorneys fees and costs, or, in the 
alternative, to advise Hooten that future motions will not be considered.     
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Rule 60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review.  See Browder v. 
Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978).  Upon review, we conclude that the District 
Court properly denied Hooten’s motion.    
 In short, Hooten presented no basis for relief under Rule 60(b).  It is not entirely 
clear if Hooten claimed legal error, but “legal error, without more, cannot justify granting 
a Rule 60(b) motion.”  Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1988).  Hooten did not 
put before the District Court material new evidence that could not have been discovered 
earlier with reasonable diligence.  See Compass Tech., Inc. v. Tseng Labs,, Inc., 71 F.3d 
1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1995).  He also did not make the necessary “showing of exceptional 
circumstances” to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6).  See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 
280 F.3d 262, 273 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under no provision of Rule 60(b) is Hooten entitled to 
relief from the District Court’s ruling (which was entered after a thorough review of the 
record and the law).  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.2      
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 Hooten’s motion to submit the CD/expand the record is denied.  We will award costs to 
Greggo and Ferrara Company under Rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
but we decline to award attorneys’ fees, or to advise Hooten, at this time, that we will 
entertain no other motions from him.  Although Hooten’s appeal is without merit, we do 
not lightly exercise our discretion to sanction a pro se litigant who may not have realized 
that his arguments were doomed to fail.  See Fed. R. App. P. 38; cf. Simmons v. Poppell, 
837 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1988) (describing how a court must be “particularly cautious” in 
imposing sanctions against pro se litigants).  However, our decision regarding sanctions 
or any future motions should in no way be considered as undermining our ruling that the 
District Court’s rejection of the Rule 60(b) motions was proper.  Furthermore, Hooten is 
now on notice that his arguments are not a basis for reopening.     
